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Abstract
There is a growing need for abstractions in logic specification languages such as FO(·)
and ASP. One technique to achieve these abstractions are templates (sometimes called
macros). While the semantics of templates are virtually always described through a syn-
tactical rewriting scheme, we present an alternative view on templates as second order
definitions. To extend the existing definition construct of FO(·) to second order, we in-
troduce a powerful compositional framework for defining logics by modular integration of
logic constructs specified as pairs of one syntactical and one semantical inductive rule. We
use the framework to build a logic of nested second order definitions suitable to express
templates. We show that under suitable restrictions, the view of templates as macros is
semantically correct and that adding them does not extend the descriptive complexity of
the base logic, which is in line with results of existing approaches.
KEYWORDS: compositionality, modularity, templates, macros, semantics, second order
logic
1 Introduction
Declarative specification languages have proven to be useful in a variety of appli-
cations, however sometimes parts of specifications contain duplicate information.
This commonly occurs when different instantiations are needed of an abstract con-
cept. For example, in an application, we may have to assert of multiple relations
that they are an equivalence relation, or multiple relations of which we need to de-
fine their transitive closure. In most current logics, the constraints (e.g., reflexivity,
symmetry and transitivity) need to be reasserted for each relation.
In the early days of programming, imperative programming languages suffered
from a similar situation where code duplication was identified as a problem. The first
solution proposed to this was the use of macros, where a syntactical replacement
was made for every instantiation of the macro. For specification languages, the
analog for macros was introduced (e.g. in ASP), most often called templates. These
allow us to define a concept and instantiating it multiple times, without making the
language more computationally complex. Asserting that the two relations P and Q
are equivalence relations could be done using a template isEqRelation as follows:
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Example 1: This example defines an equivalence relation
{isEqRelation(F) ←
∀a : F(a,a).
∀a,b : F(a,b) ⇔ F(b,a).
∀a,b,c : (F(a,b) ∧ F(b,c)) ⇒ F(a,c).
}
isEqRelation(P) ∧ isEqRelation(Q).
In existing treatments of templates, their semantics is given in a transformational
way, essentially by translating them away as if they were macros. This appraoch
has its limitations. An intellectually more gratifying view, certainly in a declarative
setting, is that templates are higher order definitions. This allows for a much more
general treatment. In some interesting cases, these higher order template definitions
are recursive (see Example 4). In others, like the template symbol tc(P,Q) specifying
P as the transitive closure of Q, the definiens is itself an inductive definition (see
Example 2) nested in the template definition of tc.
The goal of this work is to introduce a declarative template mechanism for the
language FO(·). This logic posesses an expressive first order definition construct in
the form of rules under well-founded semantics which was shown suitable to express
informal definitions of the most common types (Denecker and Vennekens 2014). We
want to extend FO(·)’s definition construc of to nested higher order definitions.
In the first part of this paper, we present a compositional framework for building
an infinite class of logics. This framework specifies a principled way for building
rule formalisms under well-founded and stable semantics from arbitrary logics, and
ways to compose and nest arbitrary language constructs including higher order
symbols, rule sets and aggregates. In the second part we use this framework to
build a template formalism. As a last contribution we show that under suitable
conditions, the standard approach of templates as rewriting macros also works in
this formalism, thus recovering the results of existing approaches.
2 Related Work
Abstraction techniques have been an important area of research since the dawn of
programming (Shaw 1984). Popular programming languages such as C++ consider
templates as a keystone for abstractions (Musser et al. 2009). Within the ASP
community, work by Ianni et al. (Ianni et al. 2004) and Baral et al. (Baral et al.
2006) introduced concepts to support composability, called templates and macros
respectively. The key idea is to abstract away common constructs through the
definition of generic ‘template’ predicates. These templates can then be resolved
using a rewriting algorithm.
More formal attempts at introducing more abstractions in ASP were made. Dao-
Tran et al. introduced modules which can be used in similar ways as templates
(Dao-Tran et al. 2009) but has the disadvantage that his template system introduces
additional computational complexity, so the user has to be very careful when trying
to write an efficient specification.
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Previously, meta-programming (Abramson and Rogers 1989) has also been used
to introduce abstractions, for example in systems such as HiLog (Chen et al. 1993).
One of HiLogs most notable features is that it combines a higher-order syntax with
a first-order semantics. HiLogs main motivation for this is to introduce a useful
degree of second order yet remain decidable. While decidability is undeniably an
interesting property, the problem of decidability already arises in logic programs
under well-founded or stable semantics, certainly with the inclusion of inductive
definitions: the issue of undecidability is not inherent to the addition of template
behavior. As a result, in recent times deduction inference has been replaced by
various other, more practical inference methods such as model checking, model
expansion, or querying. Furthermore, for practical applications, we impose the re-
striction of stratified templates for which an equivalent first-order semantics exists.
An alternative approach is to see a template instance as a call to another theory,
using another solver as an oracle. An implementation of this approach exists in
HEX (Eiter et al. 2011). This implementation however suffers from the fact that
the different calls occur in different processes. As a consequence, not enough infor-
mation is shared which hurts the search. This is analog to the approach presented
in (Tasharrofi and Ternovska 2011), where a general approach to modules is pre-
sented. A template would be an instance of a module in this framework, however
the associated algebra lacks the possibility to quantify over modules.
Previous efforts where made to generalize common language concepts, such as the
work by Lifschitz (Lifschitz 1999) who extended logic programs to allow arbitrary
nesting of conjunction ∧, disjunction ∨ and negation as failure in rule bodies. The
nesting in this paper is of very different kind, by allowing the full logic, including
definitions itself, in the body.
3 Preliminaries
Symbols. We assume an infinite supply of (typed) symbols. A vocabulary Σ is a set
of (typed) symbols. For each symbol σ, τ(σ) is its type. For a tuple σ¯, τ(σ¯) denotes
the tuple of types.
An untyped logic is one with a single type. But for the purposes of this paper, it is
natural to use at least a simple form of typing, namely to distinguish between first
order symbols and the second order (template) symbols. We distinguish between
base types (some of which may be interpreted, e.g., B,Z) and composite types. A
simple type system that suffices for this paper consists of the following types:
• base types δ and B; δ represents the domain;
• first order types: n-ary predicate types δn → B and function types δn → δ.
As usual, propositional symbols and constants are predicate and function
symbols of arity n = 0.
• second order types: n-ary predicate types (τ1, . . . , τn)→ B with each τi a first
order type or δ.
This is the type system that we have in mind in this paper. It suffices to handle
untyped first order logic and second order predicates (no second order functions
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are needed). However, the framework below is well-defined for much richer type
systems (including higher order types, type theory).
(Partial) values. For interpreted base types, there is a fixed domain of values. E.g.,
the domain of the boolean type B is T wo = {t, f}. For other base types τ , the do-
main of values is chosen freely. For composite types, the set of values is constructed
from the values of the base types.
For the simple type system above, the values of all types are determined by the
choice of the domain associated with δ. For any domain D, we can define the domain
τD of any type τ as follows:
• δD = D, BD = T wo
• first order predicates: (δn → B)D is the set of all functions from Dn to T wo (or
equivalently, the set of all subsets of Dn). For first order functions, (δn → δ)D
is the set of all functions from Dn to D.
• second order predicates: ((τ1, . . . , τn) → B)D is the set of all functions from
τ1
D × · · · × τnD to T wo.
To define the semantics of inductive definitions, partial values for predicates are
essential (since only predicates are defined in the logics of this paper, we do not
introduce partial values for functions). A partial set on domain D is a function
from D to T hree = {t,u, f}. A partial value of a predicate type τ ′ = (τ¯ → B) in
domain D is a partial set with domain τ¯D. T hree extends T wo and is equipped
with two partial orders: the truth order ≤ is the least partial order satisfying f ≤
u ≤ t, the precision order ≤p the least partial order satisfying u≤p f ,u≤p t. The
orders ≤ and ≤p on T hree are pointwise extended to partial sets. u is seen as an
approximation of truth values, not as a truth value in its own right. A partial set
that is maximally precise has range T wo and is called exact. A partial set S is seen
as an approximation of any exact set S for which S ≤p S.
(Partial) Interpretations. A partial Σ-interpretation I consists of a suitable domain
τI for every type τ in Σ (which is the set of partial sets on τdI in case τ is a predicate
type with domain type τd), and for every symbol σ ∈ Σ of type τ a value σI ∈ τI .
An exact Σ-interpretation is one that assigns exact values. The class of partial
Σ-interpretations is denoted Int(Σ); the class of exact Σ-interpretations is Int(Σ).
The precision order ≤p and truth order ≤ are extended to partial interpretations
in the standard way: I ≤p I ′ if I, I ′ interpret the same vocabulary Σ, have the same
values for all types and non-predicate symbols, and P I ≤p P I′ for every predicate
symbol P ∈ Σ. Likewise for the truth order ≤. We use I to denote a partial
interpretation (which may be exact) and I to denote an exact interpretation.
The restriction of a Σ-interpretation I to Σ′ ⊆ Σ is denoted as I|Σ′ . If I is a
partial Σ-interpretation, σ a symbol (that might not belong to Σ) and v a well-
typed value for σ, then I[σ : v] is the (Σ∪{σ})-interpretation identical to I except
that v is the value of σ.
Given an interpretation I of at least the types of Σ, a domain atom of an n-
ary predicate symbol P ∈ Σ of type τ¯ → B in I is a pair (P, d) where d ∈ τ¯I .
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It is denoted as P (d). If I interprets P , a domain atom P (d) has a truth value
P (d)I = P I(d).
For any v ∈ T hree and set X of domain atoms of partial interpretation I,
we denote I[X : t] the interpretation identical to I except that each A ∈ X is
true; similarly for I[X : u], I[X : f ]. We may concatenate such notions and write
I[X : u][Y : f ], with the obvious meaning (first revising X, next revising Y ).
Logics Lυ. A logic is specified as a pair (L, υ) (denoted Lυ) such that L is a function
mapping vocabularies Σ to sets L(Σ) of expressions over Σ, and υ is a two-valued
or three-valued truth assignment. An expression ϕ of L(Σ) has free symbols in Σ;
it may contain other symbols provided they are bound by some scoping construct
in a subexpression of ϕ (e.g., a quantifier). If Σ ⊆ Σ′, then L(Σ) ⊆ L(Σ′).
A (three-valued) truth assignment υ maps tuples (ϕ, I) where I interprets all
free symbols of ϕ, to T hree. This function satisfies the following properties: (1) if
ϕ ∈ L(Σ), Σ ⊆ Σ′ and I is a Σ′-interpretation, then ϕυ:I = ϕυ:I|Σ ; (2) exactness:
ϕυ:I ∈ T wo for every exact interpretation I; (3) ≤p -monotonicity: if I ≤p I ′ then
ϕυ:I ≤p ϕυ:I′ . A two-valued truth assignment υ is defined only for exact interpre-
tations and satisfies (1) and (2).
Definition 3.1. We say that two formulas ϕ1 and ϕ2 over Σ1 and Σ2 respectively
are Σ-equivalent, with Σ ⊆ (Σ1∩Σ2), if for any interpretation I over Σ, there exists
an expansion I1 to Σ1 for which ϕ
υ:I1 = t iff there exists an expansion I2 of I to
Σ2 for which ϕ
υ:I2 = t. If in addition Σ1 = Σ2 = Σ, we call ϕ1 and ϕ2 equivalent;
hey have the same truth value in all Σ-interpretations.
4 Well-founded and stable semantics for L-rule sets
In this section, we show that for each logic Lυ with a three-valued truth assignment
υ, it is possible to define a rule logic under a well-founded and under a stable
semantics. Let Lυ be such a logic.
Definition 4.1. An L-rule over Σ is an expression ∀x(P (x)← ϕ) with P a predi-
cate symbol in Σ, x a tuple of “variable” symbols and ϕ ∈ L(Σ ∪ {x}). An L-rule
set over Σ is a set of L-rules over Σ. Rule sets will be denoted with ∆.
The set Def(∆) is the set of predicate symbols P ∈ Σ that occur in the head of
a rule. Par(∆) is the set of all other symbols that occur in ∆. Elements of Def(∆)
are called defined symbols, the other ones are called parameters of ∆.
Definition 4.2. A context O of a L-rule set ∆ is a Σ \Def(∆)-interpretation.
For a given context O, the set {I | I|Par(∆) = O} of partial Σ-interpretations
expanding O is isomorphic to the set of partial sets of domain atoms of Def(∆) in O.
Thus, givenO, a partial set of domain atoms specifies a unique partial interpretation
I expanding O and vice versa.
We call a set of domain atoms a t-set, respectively u-set, f -set of partial inter-
pretation I if its elements have truth value t, respectively u, f in I.
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Definition 4.3. A partial interpretation I is closed under ∆ if for any domain
atom P (d) and rule ∀x(P (x)← ϕ) ∈ ∆, if ϕ[d]υ:I = t then P (d)υ:I = t.
Definition 4.4. An unfounded set of ∆ in I is a u-set U of defined domain atoms
in I, for which every atom P (d) ∈ U and rule ∀x(P (x)← ϕ) ∈ ∆, ϕ[d]υ:I[U :f ] = f .
Definition 4.5. A partial interpretation I extending context O is a partial stable
interpretation of ∆ if
1. for each domain atom P (d), P (d)I = Max≤{ϕ[d]υ:I | ∀x(P (x)← ϕ) ∈ ∆};
2. (prudence) there exists no non-empty t-set T and no (possibly empty) u-set U
of I such that I[T : u][U : t] is closed under ∆;
3. (braveness) the only unfounded set of ∆ in I is ∅.
Definition 4.6. We call a partial interpretation I a well-founded interpretation of
∆ if I is the ≤p -least partial stable model I ′ of ∆ such that I ′|Par(∆) = I|Par(∆).
Definition 4.7. We call an (exact) interpretation I a stable interpretation of ∆ if
I is an exact partial stable model of ∆.
Given that a stable I has only the empty u-set, conditions (2) and (3) simplify
to that there is no non-empty t-set T of I such that I[T : u] is closed under ∆.
Proposition 4.8. Let ϕ,ϕ′ be equivalent under υ (same truth value in all partial
interpretations). Then substituting ϕ for ϕ′ in the body of a rule of ∆ preserves the
class of partial stable (hence, well-founded and stable) interpretations.
Proof. This is trivial, since the conditions of partial stable interpretation are defined
in terms υ, which cannot distinguish ϕ from ϕ′.
Two logics. Using the above two concepts we define two rule logics. Expressions in
both logics are the same: finite sets of rules.
Definition 4.9. For logic Lυ, we define logic R(Lυ)w where R(Lυ)(Σ) is the col-
lection of finite rule sets over Σ and w the two-valued truth assignment defined as
∆w:I = t if I is an exact well-founded interpretation of ∆ and ∆w:I = f otherwise.
Definition 4.10. For logic Lυ, we define the logic R(Lυ)st where R(Lυ)(Σ) is as
above and st is the two-valued truth assignment defined as ∆st:I = t if I is an exact
stable interpretation of ∆ and ∆st:I = f otherwise.
For the logic FOk , with FO first order logic and k the 3-valued Kleene truth
assignment (Kleene 1952), the rule formalism R(FOk )w corresponds to the (formal)
definitions in the logic FO(ID) (Denecker 2000; Denecker and Ternovska 2008) while
the formalism R(FOk )st corresponds to the rule formalism in the logic ASP-FO
(Denecker et al. 2012).
In (Denecker and Vennekens 2014), the relation between the main forms of (in-
formal) definitions found in mathematical text, and rule sets in R(FOk )w was
analyzed. Not all rule sets of R(FO) express sensible (informal) definitions, but
for those that do, the well-founded interpretations are exact and correctly specify
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the defined sets. Therefore, a rule set ∆ was called a paradox-free or total defini-
tion in an exact context O if its well-founded interpretation expanding O is exact.
For paradox-free rule sets, w and st coincide. Important classes of rule sets are
always paradox-free: non-recursive, monotone inductive rule sets, and rule sets by
ordered or iterated induction over some well-founded induction order as defined in
(Denecker and Vennekens 2014).
5 Compositional framework for building logics with definitions
This section effectively defines an infinite collection of logics. We define compo-
sitional constructs which add new expressions, such as definitions, to an existing
logic. By iterating such extension steps, these constructs can be nested.
5.1 Approximating boolean functions
We frequently need to extend a boolean function defined on a domain X of exact
values (e.g., T wo, exact sets, exact interpretations, or tuples including these) to
the domain X , ≤p of partial values. Examples are the boolean functions associated
with connectives ¬,∧, . . . , or the truth assigments w and st of R(Lυ) defined on
Int(Σ). Given such a function F : X → T wo, we search for an approximation
F : X → T hree such that:
• ≤p -montone: if x≤p y ∈ X then F(x)≤p F(y);
• exact and extending: for x ∈ X, F(x) = F (x).
Definition 5.1. We define the ultimate approximation F˜ : X → T hree of F by
defining F˜ (x) = glb≤p {F (x) | x≤p x} ∈ T hree.
Proposition 5.2. F˜ is the most precise ≤p -monotone exact extension of F .
Proof. ≤p -monotonicity follows from the transitivity of ≤p . Exactness, from the
fact that elements of Int(Σ) are maximally precise. That F˜ is the most precise
approximation of F is clear as well.
Several important examples follow. For a standard connective c ∈ {∧,∨,¬,⇒,⇔}
with corresponding boolean function c : T won → T wo, the function c˜ : T hreen →
T hree is the three-valued truth function used in the Kleene truth assignment k .
The semantics of quantifiers ∀,∃ and generalized quantifiers such as aggregates
are given by functions on sets (or tuples including sets). E.g., for quantification over
domain D these are the boolean functions ∀D,∃D defined ∀D(S) = t iff D ⊆ S, and
∃D(S) = t iff D ∩ S 6= ∅. Two commonly used numerical aggregate functions are
cardinality # and sum (the latter mapping (finite) sets S of tuples d¯ to
∑
d¯∈S d1).
For every numerical aggregate function Agg and boolean operator ∼ ∈ {=, <,>}
on numbers, the boolean function Agg∼ maps tuples (S, n) to t iff Agg(S)∼n.
For all these higher order boolean functions F , F˜ is the most precise approxima-
tion on three-valued sets. The three-valued aggregate functions A˜gg∼ were intro-
duced originally in (Pelov et al. 2007) to define stable and well-founded semantics
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for aggregate logic programs. The functions ∀˜D, ∃˜D are used in the Kleene truth
assignment k : let D be τ(x)I , and S = {(d, ϕk :I[x:d]) | d ∈ D}, i.e. the three valued
set mapping domain elements d ∈ D to ϕk :I[x:d]), one defines (∀x ϕ)k :I = ∀˜D(S) =
Min≤{S(d) | d ∈ D} = Min≤{ϕk :I[x:d]) | d ∈ D}.
For any two-valued truth assigment υ on L, υ˜ is a sound three-valued truth
assignment. In case of FO and its truth assignment υ, υ˜ was introduced in (van
Fraassen 1966) where it was called the supervaluation s. s is not truth functional,
for if pI = qI = u, then (p ∨ ¬p)s:I = t 6= (p ∨ q)s:I = u while the components of
the two disjunctions have the same supervaluation. A truth-functional definition of
a three-valued truth assignment is obtained by using the ultimate approximations of
the boolean functions associated to connectives and quantifiers. This yields exactly
the Kleene truth assigment k . It is ≤p -monotone, exact and extending, and strictly
less precise than s as can be seen from (p ∨ ¬p)k :I = u: the supervaluation “sees”
the logical connection between p and ¬p in this tautology while k does not.
Other applications serve to extend, for arbitrary logic Lυ, the two-valued well-
founded and stable truth assignments w and st on R(Lυ) to three-valued extensions
w˜, s˜t. Here, it holds that ∆w˜:I = t (respectively f) if every (respectively, no) in-
stance I of I is a well-founded interpretation of ∆.
5.2 Composing logics by combining logic constucts
A standard way of defining the syntax of a logic is through a set of often inductive
syntactical rules, typically described in Backus Naur Form (BNF). The truth as-
signment υ is then defined by recursion over the structure of the expressions. Below,
we identify a language construct C with a pair of a syntactical and a semantical
rule. The rules below construct, for a language construct C, a new logic C(Lυ)υ′
with expressions obtained by applying C on subexpressions of Lυ and υ′ a truth
assignment for C(L). Afterwards, complex logics with multiple and nested language
constructs can be built by iterating these construction steps.
• Atom1 and Atom2: for first order predicates p and second order ones P re-
spectively. t is a tuple of terms, x of variables.
Atom1 ::= p(t) where p(t)υ
′:I = pI(tI1 , · · · , tIn)
Atom2 ::= P (x) where P (x)υ
′:I = P I(xI1 , · · · , xIn)
• N-ary connectives c ∈ {¬,∧,∨,⇒,⇔},
c(Lυ) ::= c(α1, . . . , αn) where c(α1, . . . , αn)υ
′:I
= c˜(α1
υ:I , · · · , αnυ:I)
• Generalized quantifiers C ∈ {∀,∃, Agg∼}. Below, C〈x, α, z〉 denotes the syn-
tactic expression, e.g., ∀〈x, α〉 is ∀x α; Agg∼〈x, α, z〉 is Agg{x : α}∼z.
C(Lυ) ::= C〈x, α, z〉 where (C〈x, α, z〉)υ′:I = C˜({(d, αυ:I[x:d])|d ∈ τ(x)I}, zI)
• Definitions as rule sets (Rw) (similarly, one could define Rst):
Rw(Lυ) ::= R(L) where ∆υ′:I = ∆w˜:I
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where w is the well-founded assignment of R(Lυ) as defined in Section 4.
Building logics. Using the above rules of language constructs, an (infinite) class of
logics with three-valued semantics can be built. Moreover, every combination of the
above rules gives rise to a valid three-valued truth assignment.
Proposition 5.3. Every (sub)set of the above language constructs (possibly closed
under recursive application) defines a logic with a proper three-valued truth assign-
ment (i.e. it is ≤p -monotone, exact and extending).
For example, given a logic Lυ, we define L′υ′ = R(Lυ)w˜ by one application of Rw
on Lυ. By iterating Rw, logics (R(Lυ)w˜)n with nested definitions are built. Every
BNF in terms of the above language constructs now implicitly defines a three-
valued logic. The definition of first order logic FOk with k the standard three-
valued Kleene truth assignment, can be descibed in BNF or more compactly as
{Atom1,∧,∨,¬,∀,∃}∗ (here ∗ indicates recursive application of the construction
rules). The logic FO(ID) defined in (Denecker and Ternovska 2008) is the union
of logics FOk and R(FOk )w˜. A further extension is the new logic FO(ID∗) =
{Atom1,∧,∨,¬,∀,∃, Rw}∗ which has definitions nested in formulas and definition
rule bodies. A logic in which templates can easily be embedded is SO(ID∗) =
{Atom1, Atom2,∧,∨,¬,∀,∃, Rw}∗. It is a second order extension of FO(ID) which
allows for nesting of definitions in rule bodies.
6 Templates
We envision a library of application independent templates in the form of second
order definitions that encapsulate prevalent patterns and concepts and that can be
used as building blocks to compose logic specifications. Below, we formally define the
concepts and show that non-recursive templates do not increase the computational
complexity of FO(ID∗) and can be eliminated by a rewriting process.
6.1 Definition and usage
We assume the existence of a set of template symbols. A template is a context-
agnostic second order definition of template symbols. As such it should define and
contain only domain independent symbols: interpreted symbols and template sym-
bols. A template might define a template symbol in terms of other template symbols
and interpreted predicates, but not in terms of user-defined symbols.
Definition 6.1. The template vocabulary ΣTemp is the vocabulary consisting of
all interpreted symbols (such as arithmetic symbols) and all template symbols.
Definition 6.2. A template is a second order definition ∆ over ΣTemp such that
Def(∆) consists of template symbols.
Thus the set of parameters Par(∆) of a template consists only of interpreted
symbols and template symbols.
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The concepts used in Example 1 are now fully defined. Another common example
is the template tc expressing that Q/2 is the transitive closure of P/2, as shown in
Example 2. Note that this example cannot be written without a definition in the
body of the template, so this further motivates our choice to allow definitions in
the bodies of other definitions in our recursive construction of the logic SO(ID∗).
Example 2: This template TC expresses that Q is the transitive closure of P
{tc(P,Q) ←
{Q(x,y) ← P(x,y) ∨(∃ z: Q(x,z)∧Q(z,y))}.
}
Another notable aspect of this approach to templates is that recursive templates
are well-defined. This enables us to write recursive templates, for example to define
a range:
Example 3: P is the range of integers from a to b
{range(P, a, b) ←
{P(a).
P(x) ← a < b ∧ (∃ Q : range(Q,a+1,b) ∧ Q(x)).
}
}
It is possible to rewrite Example 3 into a non-recursive template. Example 4
contains an example which is not rewritable in such a way.
Example 4: cur is a winning position in a two-player game
{win(cur ,Move , IsWon) ← IsWon(cur) ∨
∃ nxt : Move(cur ,nxt) ∧ lose(nxt ,Move ,IsWon).
lose(cur ,Move , IsWon) ← ¬IsWon(cur) ∧
∀ nxt : Move(cur ,nxt) ⇒ win(nxt ,Move ,IsWon).
}
This template defining win and lose by simultaneous definition, is a monotone sec-
ond order definition and has a two-valued well-founded model. That it cannot be
rewritten without recursion over second order predicates follows from the fact that
deciding if a tuple belongs to a non-recursively defined second order predicate is
in PH while deciding winning positions in generalized games is harder (if the poly-
nomial hierarchy does not collapse) and this last problem corresponds to deciding
elementship in the relation win defined in Example 4.
Definition 6.3. A template library L is a finite set of templates satisfying (1)
every template is paradox-free; (2) every template symbol is defined in exactly one
template; (3) the set of templates is hierarchically stratified: there is a strict order
< on template symbols such that for each ∆ ∈ L, if P ∈ Def(∆), Q ∈ Par(∆) then
Q < P .
Proposition 6.4. For a template library L, each interpretation I not interpreting
symbols of ΣTemp has a unique two-valued expansion I
′ to ΣTemp that satisfies L.
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Proof. By induction on the hierarchy < of L.
6.2 The ΣTemp vocabulary restriction
The condition that templates should be built from ΣTemp and not from user-defined
symbols is to ensure that templates are domain independent ‘drop-in’ building
blocks. This restriction might seem too stringent, but we can show that many
template definitions for which it does not hold, can be rewritten as an equivalent
one for which it holds.
Let ∆ be definition of second order predicates with Def(∆) ∩ ΣTemp = ∅, and o
the tuple of all free (user-defined) symbols of Par(∆) \ ΣTemp (arranged in some
arbitrary order). For such definitions, we define a templified version. For any rule or
formula Ψ, we define Ψo to be Ψ except that every atom P (t) in Ψ with P ∈ Def(∆)
is replaced by P ′(t, o), with P ′ a new symbol extending P with new arguments
corresponding to o.
We say that a structure I corresponds to I ′ if I, I ′ interpret the free symbols
of ∆, respectively those of ∆Temp, they are identical on shared symbols and for
each P ∈ Def(∆), P I =
{
d|(d, oI) ∈ P ′I′
}
. Note that for each I ′ and each value
do for o in the domain of I
′, there is a unique interpretation I with oI = do that
corresponds to I ′.
Definition 6.5. We define the templified definition ∆Temp of ∆ as the definition
{∀o(Ψo) | Ψ ∈ ∆} and we define Σ′Temp = ΣTemp ∪ {P ′ | P ∈ Def(∆)}.
We assume that o consists only of first order predicate symbols. Under this con-
dition, the templified definition ∆Temp is a template over Σ
′
Temp.
Proposition 6.6. Let I be a well-founded model of ∆ and I ′ a well-founded model
of ∆Temp such that I and I
′ are identical on ΣTemp. Then it holds that
P I =
{
d|(d, oI) ∈ P ′I′
}
Stated differently, I corresponds to I ′. The templified definition captures the
original one, and hence, each theory can be rewritten in terms of the new templified
defined symbols.
Proof. Assume that I corresponds to I ′. It is easy to prove, by induction on the
formula structure, that for any formula ϕ in the vocabulary of ∆, it holds that ϕI =
(ϕo)I
′[o:oI ]. We call this the independency property since it shows that (ϕo)I
′[o:oI ]
is influenced by only a small part of the interpretation of P ′, namely the values of
domain atoms P ′(d, oI).
The key property to prove is that I ′ is a partial stable interpretation of ∆Temp
iff for each value do for o, the unique I that corresponds to I
′ such that oI = do
is a partial stable interpretation of ∆. Intuitively, a partial stable interpretation
of ∆Temp is a kind of union of partial stable interpretations of ∆, one for each
assignment of values to o.
We prove this property only in one direction. The other direction is similar.
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Assume that I ′ is a partial stable interpretation of ∆Temp satisfying the three
conditions of Definition 4.5. We need to show for every I that corresponds to
I ′, that I is a partial stable interpretation of ∆. Condition 1), that P (d)I =
Max≤{ϕ[d]I | ∀x(P (x) ← ϕ[x]) ∈ ∆} follows from the fact that P ′(d, oI)I′ sat-
isfies the corresponding equation for ∆Temp, that P (d)
I = P ′(d, oI)I
′
, and that
for each rule body ϕ for P , ϕ[d]I = (ϕo)I
′[o:oI ] (by the independency property).
The condition 2) follows from the fact that when T ′ = {P ′(d, oI) | P (d) ∈ T},
and U ′ = {P ′(d, oI) | P (d) ∈ U}, then T is a t-set and U a u-set of I such
that I[T : u][U : t] is closed under ∆ iff T ′ is a t-set and U ′ a u-set of I ′ such
that I ′[T ′ : u][U ′ : t] is closed under ∆Temp. This follows from the independency
property. Condition 3) is proven similarly.
It is easy to see that this property entails the proposition, since intuitively, it
entails that a well-founded model I ′ of ∆Temp, which is the glb≤p of all partial
stable interpretations of ∆Temp with the same context as I
′, contains for each
value do for o the glb≤p of the partial stable interpretations I of ∆ in the context
with oI = do.
6.3 Simple Templates
Extending a logic with arbitrary (recursive) templates may easily increase the de-
scriptive complexity of the logic. Below, we develop a simple but useful template
formalism for FO(ID) that does not have this effect. In addition, we show that
libraries of simple templates can be compiled away using them as macros.
In Figure 1 we define sublanguages FO(ID∗), ESO(ID∗) and ASO(ID∗) of
SO(ID∗) (by mutual recursion) consisting of atoms, negations, conjunctions, quan-
tification, definitions and the let-construct. This last construct represents a second
order quantification, where the quantified symbol(s) S are defined in an accompa-
nying paradox-free definition ∆. Definitions of second order symbols in ESO(ID∗)
and ASO(ID∗) contain only (possibly nested) first order definitions. Since model
checking of (nested) first order definitions is polynomial, the descriptive complexity
of FO(ID∗) is P, of ESO(ID∗) is NP and of ASO(ID∗) is co-NP.
FO(ID∗) ϕ ::=
|s(t)(∈ Atom1)
|¬ϕ
|ϕ ∧ ϕ
|∃FO s : ϕ
|let {s(t)← ϕ} in ϕ
|{s(t)← ϕ}
(a) FO(ID∗)
ESO(ID∗)  ::=
|S(t)(∈ Atom2)
|¬α
| ∧ 
|∃FO s : 
|let {s(t)← ϕ} in 
|{s(t)← ϕ}
|∃SO s : 
(b) SO(ID∗)
ASO(ID∗) α ::=
|S(t)(∈ Atom2)
|¬
|α ∧ α
|∃FO s : α
|let {s(t)← ϕ} in α
|{s(t)← ϕ}
|∀SO s : α
(c) ASO(ID∗)
Figure 1: The FO(ID∗), ESO(ID∗) and ASO(ID∗) subformalisms of SO(ID∗)
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Definition 6.7. A simple template is a template of the form {∀x(P (x)← ϕP [x])}
with P (x) ∈ Atom2 and ϕP ∈ FO(ID∗).
A simple template defines one symbol and contains one rule with an FO(ID∗)
body. Let L be a template library over ΣTemp consisting of non-recursive simple
templates. Such a library is equivalent to the conjunction the completion of its
definitions ∀x(P (x) ⇔ ϕP [x]). We want to show that while using such libraries
increases convenience, reuse, modularity, it does not increase complexity nor ex-
pressivity. Also, such libraries can be used in the common way, as macros.
Theorem 6.8. For Σ∩ΣTemp = ∅, let ϕ be a ESO(ID∗) formula over Σ∪ΣTemp
that does not contain definitions of template symbols. There exists a polynomially
larger ESO(ID∗) formula ϕ1 over Σ that is Σ-equivalent to {ϕ} ∪ L. There exists
a polynomially larger FO(ID∗) formula ϕ2 over an extension Σ1 of Σ that is Σ-
equivalent to {ϕ} ∪ L.
Proof. The formula ϕ1 is obtained by treating L as a set of macros. We iteratively
substitute template atoms P (t) in ϕ by ϕP [t]. This process is equivalence preserving.
It terminates due to the stratification condition on L, and the limit is a polynomially
larger ESO(ID∗) formula ϕ1 in the size of ϕ (exponential in #(L)) that is Σ-
equivalent to {ϕ} ∪ L.
To obtain ϕ2, we apply the well-known transformation of moving existential quan-
tifiers to the front and skolemising them. Second order quantifiers can be switched
with first order ones using:
∀FO x : ∃SOP : ϕ⇔ ∃SOP ′ : ∀FO x : ϕ[P (t)\P ′(t, x)]
This process preserves Σ-equivalence. As only a polynomial number of steps are
needed to transform the formula into this desired state, the size of the resulting
formula is polynomially larger.
Previous results in (Ianni et al. 2004) indicated that the introduction of simple,
stratified templates does not introduce a significant performance hit. The above
theorem recovers these efficiency results.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a new way to define language constructs for a logic. New
language constructs must combine a syntactical rule with a three-valued semantic
evaluation. This three-valued semantic evaluation is subject to certain restrictions.
Language constructs can then be arbitrarily combined to compose a logic. In par-
ticular, we construct SO(ID∗): a second order language with inductive definitions.
Using this language, it is easy to define templates as second order definitions. We
conclude our paper with a rewriting scheme to show that, given some restrictions,
templates do not increase the descriptive complexity of the host language.
In the future, we want to generalize our way of defining language constructs
to allow functions and provide a more comprehensive type system. On the more
practical side, we intend to bring our ideas into practice by extending the IDP(IDP
2013) system with simple templates.
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